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Natural hazards are complex events whose mitigation has generated a diverse ﬁeld of specialised natural
science expertise that is drawn upon by a wide range of practitioners and decision-makers. In this paper,
the authors bring natural science research, risk studies and science and technology studies together in
aid of clarifying the role scientiﬁc uncertainties play in the mitigation of natural hazards and their as-
sociated risks. Given that uncertainty is a necessary part of scientiﬁc practise and method, those engaged
in risk mitigation must manage these scientiﬁc uncertainties in their decision-making just as, equally,
social science researchers, stakeholders and others hoping to understand risk mitigation must under-
stand their character and inﬂuence. To this end, the authors present the results of an extensive literature
review of scientiﬁc uncertainties as they emerge in relation to wildﬁre and ﬂood risk mitigation in
Australia. The results are both a survey of these major uncertainties and a novel categorisation within
which a variety of expert and non-expert audiences might discuss and translate the scientiﬁc un-
certainties that are encountered and managed in risk mitigation.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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Natural hazard risk mitigation is an exemplar of how, in today's
world, we face complex challenges where uncertainty is rife.
Natural hazards are complex events encompassing interconnected
social, ecological, economic, and political dimensions that informLtd. This is an open access article u
Society, University of Western Syand inﬂuence each other through linear and non-linear feedback
loops. Our attempts to manage natural hazards have generated a
diverse ﬁeld of specialised natural science expertise, providing
profoundly useful and valuable insights, however uncertainty is
also intrinsic to all scientiﬁc practises and methods; while further
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practitioners and institutions engaged in risk mitigation necessa-
rily encounter these scientiﬁc uncertainties in their decision-
making, without the availability of straightforward solutions, and
with the stressful prospects of both a natural hazard event, and the
likelihood of having to account for decisions to ofﬁcial inquiries,
courts, news media, and other forums.
In this paper, we bring natural science research, risk studies
and science and technology studies together in aid of clarifying the
role scientiﬁc uncertainties play in the mitigation of natural ha-
zards and their associated risks. We do so with reference to two
motivating concepts. The ﬁrst is Ien Ang's notion of ‘cultural in-
telligence’: to take complexity seriously as an inherent and irre-
ducible part of our world, whilst also ﬁnding conceptual and dis-
cursive ways to navigate through it [5]. The important work of
simpliﬁcation (not simplifying) to plot a course through com-
plexity (rather than dispensing with it) is a strategic and enabling
response to context. If social and physical science researchers do
not diligently work to preserve complexity through simpliﬁcation
the former can, and very likely will, reappear when least welcome
to render a schema null [97]. Similarly, while forms of scientiﬁc
knowledge are crucial to understanding natural hazards, they are
neither homogenous nor autonomous; it is not possible to simply
defer to scientiﬁc authority to ‘solve’ the complex issues of redu-
cing natural hazard risk, nor is it desirable to abandon the task of
translating complexities across scientiﬁc and non-scientiﬁc
contexts.
The second motivating concept is disaster risk reduction, or the
identifying, assessing and reducing of disaster risks from a broad
range of perspectives. Fostering the role of social resilience in re-
ducing vulnerability is a vital aspect of risk reduction, an end that
requires both increasing the range of available knowledge for
problem-solving and building cross-scale problem-solving net-
works [12]. As such, resilience ideally involves the communication
of scientiﬁc knowledge and its related uncertainties to non-expert
groups. In regards to natural hazards, a signiﬁcant amount of the
attention paid to such communication has been within a ‘hazard
paradigm’ (see [50]); that is, it has been focused on messaging,
weighing the relative merits of incorporating uncertainty into the
design and dissemination of scientiﬁc information (e.g. [73,14]).
Rather than translating uncertainties ‘out’ to non-experts, an al-
ternate approach towards resilience would be the production of
‘dialogic’ or ‘middle’ terms useful for participatory deliberation
and the co-production of knowledge between expert and non-
expert groups (see [36]).
As part of plotting the ‘navigational’ path, the authors have
focused on two natural hazards in order to both review a broad
selection of scientiﬁc methods and their uncertainties and to avoid
compressing scientiﬁc complexities. Further, in order to maximise
the practical applicability of this review we have focused upon
uncertainties that emerge in wildﬁre and ﬂuvial ﬂood risk miti-
gation in Australia.1 Australia is a land of marked seasonal varia-
tion, world renowned for ‘droughts and ﬂooding rains’, as well as
highly ﬂammable eucalyptus forests. In January 2009, wildﬁres in
Victoria led to 173 fatalities and the burning of 450,000 ha [34]. In
December 2010–January 2011, ﬂoods in southeast Queensland
were responsible for 37 fatalities, approximately $2.38 billion in
damages, and an estimated $30 billion in lost revenue [128].
Though low frequency, these high magnitude hazard events have
brought renewed public and government attention to their1 For the sake of clarity, we focus on river (ﬂuvial) ﬂoods (as against ﬂash
ﬂoods, urban ﬂoods, pluvial ﬂoods, sewer ﬂoods, coastal ﬂoods and glacial lake
outburst ﬂoods) because they are the dominant hazard in Australia. A signiﬁcant
amount of the scientiﬁc practises presented here are nonetheless relevant to other
forms of ﬂooding.prediction and mitigation, particularly as their occurrence is likely
to increase in Australia due to the effects of climate change [70].
Risk is also increasing due to demographic shifts into hazard areas
such as ﬂoodplains and wildland–urban interfaces, and growing
concern over biodiversity loss and rare and endangered species is
bringing new dimensions to risk mitigation.
In the development of scientiﬁc knowledges around such
ﬂoods and wildﬁres, and their application to risk mitigation, the
challenges are multi-dimensional. For instance, not only are there
issues relating to pure research and implementation—such as
current knowledge, funding, institutional priorities, institutional
literacy, intellectual property—but also the coordination of multi-
ple scientiﬁc practises. Predicting and managing a hazard ne-
cessarily involves different methodologies, each attuned to dif-
ferent aspects of that hazard’s probable occurrence and behaviour.
For example, understanding ﬂood risk in a given area typically
involves not only climatological knowledge of the long-term
trends in weather events, meteorological knowledge of short-term
weather events, hydrological knowledge of rainfall-runoff re-
sponses and hydraulic knowledge of ﬂow depth and velocity
changes downstream; it also calls upon environmental–geo-
graphical knowledges regarding vegetation, topography, land use,
population distribution and so on (see [29]). No one methodology
can be relied upon to predict the probabilities and consequences of
a given hazard, while together these diverse knowledges are more
than the sum of their parts.
At the same time, the management of natural hazards in Aus-
tralia, as in many countries, is conditioned also by institutional
diversity. Different government and non-government agencies
hold legal responsibility for different aspects of prevention, pre-
paredness, response and recovery (the PPRR spectrum) in relation
to different hazards. Historically, this distribution of responsibility
has led to major operational issues and preventable losses during
natural hazard events (e.g. [46,147]), leading to the recent ‘all-
hazards-all-agencies’ policies [30]. The approach places a high
value on technical interoperability between agencies, such as
having compatible communication and information management
systems and processes, and strategic interoperability, including
sharing information, resources and planning exercises. As such,
any one scientiﬁc methodology cannot and should not be con-
sidered the domain of any one individual or any one agency; op-
timally, knowledges and knowledge practises will pass through
the necessary relays and translation between and within agencies
efﬁciently. The assumption of the ‘all-hazards’ approach is that, as
in the case of scientiﬁc methodologies more generally, together
these diverse agencies are more than the sum of their parts.
Risk mitigation is also shaped by the intersecting public policy
discourses of mutual responsibility and deliberative policy pro-
duction (see [56,92,159]). In multiple ways, and with varying de-
grees of success, governments in Australia and elsewhere have
made efforts to incorporate citizens into different aspects of policy
planning and delivery, such as through greater public disclosure,
incorporating stakeholders into design processes, conducting
public education campaigns, amongst other strategies. The justi-
ﬁcation for such approaches may derive from normative values,
such as democracy or equity, or functional values, such as efﬁ-
ciency and sustainability, and seek a variety of ends; as many
commentators note, stakeholder engagement has sometimes been
a method for responsibility-shifting by government agents and
agencies [143]. Such considerations bring to the fore fundamental
issues regarding the relative power and knowledges of those in-
volved, particularly regarding knowledge diversity, public trust in
scientiﬁc expertise and public understandings of science (see
[132]). As the twinned sociological ﬁelds of risk studies and sci-
ence and technology studies have made apparent, the boundaries
between scientiﬁc research, scientiﬁc knowledges and the
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are ‘permeable, changeable, and contestable’ [144].
To be clear, the authors of this review neither subscribe to the
‘deﬁcit model’ of the public understanding of science—which
classes publics as knowledge-deﬁcient and devalues the role of
other knowledges in the co-production of scientiﬁc knowledge—
nor do we contest the very idea of ‘experts’ [130]. There are sig-
niﬁcant and valid reasons to assume that expert scientiﬁc knowl-
edges are different to others and that, therefore, the interface
between diverse knowledges necessary to hazard prediction, ‘all-
hazards’ management and deliberative policy is one of translation.
Further, success in meeting these ends will hinge in part on the
legibility of heterogeneous scientiﬁc methods to both risk practi-
tioners operating in multiple institutional circumstances and non-
experts. While Schaake et al. [121] state that there are ‘tre-
mendous uncertainties’ in ﬂood prediction, and Moore et al. [98]
suggest that ﬂood risk practitioners must ‘embrace uncertainty’,
the authors of this review propose that such an embrace also re-
quires practitioners and researchers to navigate and translate
scientiﬁc uncertainties.
To this end, the authors completed a literature review of the
diverse forms of scientiﬁc knowledge and uncertainties sur-
rounding wildﬁre and ﬂood risk. Using relevant databases (e.g.
Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar), approximately 300 aca-
demic sources on wildﬁre and ﬂood science were drawn upon in
completing this review, including research on hazard modelling,
prescribed burning, hydrological engineering, development plan-
ning, meteorology, climatology and evacuation planning. The re-
view also incorporated indicative research regarding the public
understandings of science, public policy, risk communication and
deliberative planning in order to scope the signiﬁcant un-
certainties that emerge in risk mitigation practise. In reviewing
this literature, though, the authors did not seek to itemise the
uncertainties of each speciﬁc scientiﬁc practise, but rather to take
a hazard-centred approach. This was done in order to focus on the
uncertainties particular to these hazards while, at the same time,
seeking to produce categories that are relevant to risk mitigation
generally. The explicit aims of this review were therefore twofold.
First, we sought to provide a comprehensive review of the scien-
tiﬁc practises brought to bear in mitigating these two natural
hazards. Second, in line with the aforementioned principles of
fostering cultural intelligence and social resilience, we sought to
develop a categorisation of uncertainties as they emerge in these
practises that would be useful to discussions and translations
within and between expert and non-expert audiences. As a result,
the authors have identiﬁed three categories of uncertainty that are
applicable across these hazards: historicist, instrumental, and in-
terventionist. As both a description and a heuristic, this categor-
isation has been developed to provide greater clarity to re-
searchers, practitioners, decision-makers and stakeholders work-
ing in this ﬁeld.2. Risk, risk mitigation and scientiﬁc uncertainty
Internationally, risk is typically considered as a function of a
given hazard, the distribution of exposure to that hazard, and the
vulnerability of what is exposed, measured in terms of con-
sequences and probabilities (e.g. [69,71]). This complexity is
widely articulated in the emergency management sector in Aus-
tralia, for example, which identiﬁes that wildﬁre risk arises out of
the combination of the hazard (the wildﬁre prone landscape
which is both physically and socially deﬁned and created); what is
considered at risk (usually, people, property, and ecological com-
munities); and, the vulnerability or resilience of those considera-
tions to the hazard (how they are affected by the hazard) (e.g.[47]). Often reduced to ‘probability consequences’ [127], risk
management in Australia emphasises the protection of people and
property, with environmental values (e.g. ﬂora and fauna) be-
coming increasingly recognised. The effect of wildﬁres, ﬂoods and
other natural hazards are, in turn, often described in physical
terms, though other impacts including emotional suffering for
families and individuals, community distress, and reduced quality
of life are also often considered [65].
While these various deﬁnitions are subtle and possess sig-
niﬁcant functional utility, they do not make explicit the situated
and contingent character of probabilities and consequences, fac-
tors which can have a determining inﬂuence on policy and plan-
ning. As sociologist Peter Glasner [56] argues, ‘any discussion of
risk is as much about culture, institutions, perceptions, control and
activity as it is about how risks are framed by experts’. As such, the
sociological literature on risk has tended to speak of ‘risk culture’
or ‘risk society’. A risk society, as described in the work of Ulrich
Beck and Anthony Giddens, is a social formation in which vul-
nerability to, and responsibility for, hazards are the object of cal-
culation and calculated distribution across populations. Reviewing
this scholarship, Scott Lash [83] summarises its achievements as
having uncovered the ways in which we are all articulated in re-
lation to uncertainties and vulnerabilities—and practises of ﬁgur-
ing uncertainties and vulnerabilities—that are neither simply in-
dividually chosen nor naturally allocated. As Beck argues [10],
news media, scientiﬁc experts, governments, courts and insurance
agencies, amongst others, are all important in shaping dominant
deﬁnitions of what is and is not a risk, what causes a risk, who is
liable for a risk, and so on.
Utilising geographer John Handmer’s [58] tripartite analysis of
ﬂood risk, we can think of both wildﬁre and ﬂood risk mitigation
as an intermediary stage between ‘risk creation’ and ‘residual risk’.
Risk creation names those processes, such as urban planning,
through which populations, values and assets are placed in rela-
tion to a natural hazard. Knowingly or unknowingly, consequences
of various magnitudes are created in relation to hazard events of
various probabilities. Subsequently, risk mitigation involves those
processes through which government-mandated agencies and
individuals attempt to limit given vulnerabilities to that hazard.
Responsible agencies and people make choices regarding the re-
lative importance of values and assets in light of the technical,
political and economic feasibility of available mitigation strategies.
Residual risk, in this schema, therefore names the processes
through which remaining vulnerability is distributed to, and
knowingly and unknowingly borne by, emergency management,
private agencies and individuals, insurance companies and others.
By design, such an analysis differs from broader deﬁnitions of risk
management as ‘the culture, processes and structures that are
directed towards effective management of potential opportunities
and adverse effects’ [114]. The authors also note that the growing
formal recognition of biodiversity and rare and endangered spe-
cies as at-risk values during natural hazard events likely requires a
modiﬁcation of this tripartite analysis of risk to acknowledge that
some values predate anthropogenic risk creation.
Like risk itself, the scientiﬁc knowledges utilised in mitigation
are shaped—but not determined—by the context in which they
emerge. This insight is at the centre of science and technology
studies (STS), which emphasises the importance of examining how
knowledges are produced and naturalised (see [55]). As sociologist
David Turnbull [142] argues, we should think of scientiﬁc knowl-
edges as sets of practises employed by speciﬁc individuals la-
bouring in collaboration with speciﬁc apparatuses in speciﬁc in-
stitutional locations. For example, we calculate the likelihood and
consequences of wildﬁre in a given place through an assemblage
of agents: measuring devices (anemometers, thermometers, hy-
grometers, fuel estimation scales); archives of historical data
2 Collins and Evans use of ‘golem’ corresponds to the creature from Jewish
mythology.
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through calibration and validation experiments to establish causal
relations between multiple data and devices. Mitigation is, on this
account, reliant on the creation of synthetic facts or ‘combinable
mobiles’ [84], that are comprehensible, translatable and available
across disparate locations. Through mitigation practises, scientiﬁc
knowledges travel and are tested, becoming translocal and indeed
transnational, whilst also always arising out of local practises and
contexts (cf. [141]). Fire danger measures such as McArthur Forest
Fire Danger Index (FFDI), the Canadian Forest Fire Weather Index
System, and the United States National Fire Danger Ratings System
are examples of such combinable mobiles, devised to represent
hazard levels in a single quantum. Mitigation is also, therefore,
both conventionalised and contingent in the sense that such de-
vices, archives, algorithms and quanta are both functioning
‘things-to-be-used’ and ﬂuid ‘things-in-a-process-of-transforma-
tion’ [78].
Unlike this review, which categorises uncertainties according to
type, STS scholars have developed critical deﬁnitions of un-
certainty according to levels of conﬁdence. Wynne [158], for ex-
ample, usefully differentiates risk, uncertainty, indeterminacy and
ignorance (see also [131]). Whereas ‘risk’, in this instance, is the
situation in which both parameters and probabilities are well
known, in ‘uncertainty’ parameters are known but probabilities
are not. Indeterminacy, alternately, points to the openness of
causal chains, prone to interruptions, anomalies and human error.
Such descriptive analyses of levels of uncertainty indicate that
uncertainty itself is ‘best seen as a relation… constructed from
judgements based on possibly inadequate assumptions, and are
therefore contingent’ [126]. Further, this form of ‘risk’ is a mis-
nomer for our purposes, in that it outlines a condition of perfect
calculability that STS scholars, Wynne amongst them, deem an
impossible and dangerous fantasy. Even if various parties im-
plicitly or explicitly identify with such scientistic views, they do
not reﬂect the realities of risk management and mitigation. In
actuality, understanding natural hazard risk involves the episte-
mological wrangling of uncertainties around aleatory or chance
events; the extent to which we can be conﬁdent in results are a
matter of judgement about the parameters and probabilities at
hand (see [138]).
Together, risk studies and STS illustrate the necessity of at-
tending to how knowledge about a hazard is shaped by the con-
tingencies of what may be, and what those involved contend may
be, known and achieved in a place and time. In many instances,
both lay and expert groups may only perceive a hazard ‘down-
stream’, long after its initial occurrence. In other instances, a form
of risk mitigation based on available calculations may be mistaken
for a surety, leading to drastic increases in the number of assets
that are put at risk [25][123,129]. Thus, in thinking about risk
mitigation we should not lose sight of the complex political, eco-
nomic and social context in which the reception and utilisation of
scientiﬁc research is a matter of ‘who is engaged and which in-
terests are represented’ [107]. Just as scientiﬁc uncertainties can
elicit necessary caution and new lines of inquiry, they can equally
be exploited for partisan gain. This is clearly evident in the how
uncertainties in climate change science have been used in public
debate, media and politics [66].
None of this is to suggest that uncertainties surrounding nat-
ural hazards are necessarily overwhelming or that risk mitigation
does not involve rigorous deliberative analysis. Instead, it raises
two suppositions to frame further analysis. First, given that neither
hazards nor at-risk values and assets are wholly calculable, the
socioeconomic and socionatural effects of attempts to plan and
understand mitigation interventions are also intrinsically un-
certain. Just as uncertainties propagate across spatial levels of
analysis, as in climate change scenarios (see [39]), so too do theyaccumulate across temporal levels of analysis. Future courses of
action and inaction are not wholly knowable; uncertainty is a
necessary condition of risk mitigation practise, though it is not
necessarily a problematic condition. To use the ‘Rumsfeldian’
knowledge matrix, practitioners’ levels of conﬁdence operate
within the shifting bounds of known knowns, known unknowns,
unknown knowns and unknown unknowns [150]. Therefore, as
Moore et al. [[98]] suggest in relation to ﬂood risk, risk mitigation
professionals must determinedly detect, analyse, manage and
translate—or ‘embrace’—uncertainty in their application of scien-
tiﬁc knowledges if they hope to more comprehensively manage a
given risk.
Second, risk mitigation policies and practises should be un-
derstood as historically conditioned, and not simply inevitable or
optimal. This is a tenet often well understood by risk mitigation
practitioners, attuned to the ﬂaws of previous policies and prac-
tises, though nonetheless worth stating explicitly. In the United
States, for example, the use of ignition suppression to mitigate
wildﬁre risk [26,35] and the use of levees and other engineering
solutions to mitigate ﬂood risk [108,139] have proven ﬂawed in
their application, shaped as much by institutional ‘lock-in’, re-
source limitations and contemporary politics as by contemporary
scientiﬁc knowledges. Today, in Australia, the dominant methods
of wildﬁre risk mitigation are fuel reduction burning and other
fuel treatments, development planning, building regulations and
evacuation planning, while the dominant methods of ﬂood risk
mitigation are engineering works, development planning, building
regulations and evacuation planning. It is important to remain
aware that these forms of mitigation and their related un-
certainties are not the only possibilities; they are simply the ones
that hazard characteristics, landscape properties, and past and
present events and trends have brought to prominence.
The following section reviews a signiﬁcant body of con-
temporary scientiﬁc literature regarding wildﬁre and ﬂood risk
mitigation. For the purposes of this review, the authors have for-
mulated three distinct categories of scientiﬁc uncertainties that
are, to a greater or lesser extent, necessarily part of the scientiﬁc
management of these hazards. In order to preserve complexity in
these categories, each uncertainty is further subdivided into the
two to three permutations or forms of uncertainty it comprises.
These categories and forms are themselves a heuristic for further
analysis and have been formulated to be comprehensive without
being exhaustive. Examples of each form of uncertainty have been
included in the hopes of also providing the reader with a sound
survey of the dominant methodologies used by scientiﬁc practi-
tioners in Australia to predict and mitigate these hazards.3. Categories of scientiﬁc uncertainties
Following sociologists Collins and Evans [32], if we hope to
understand scientiﬁc expertise and knowledges, we must pay at-
tention to the extent to which their major debates and un-
certainties are capable of relative ‘closure’ or consensus. In pro-
vocative (and perhaps unnecessarily normative) terms (see [115]),
Collins and Evans usefully distinguish between ‘normal science’
ﬁelds, where core debates have been resolved within the scientiﬁc
community, and three others. ‘Golem science’, the second cate-
gory, names ﬁelds which contain the potential for such closure but
have not yet reached a level of relative consensus.2 Thus, whereas
the medical use of vaccines would be an example of the ‘normal’
kind, an example of the latter would be the causal link between
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cause their lack of relative closure gives them the potential for
signiﬁcant volatility. The last two categories outlined by Collins
and Evans are related—‘historical science’ and ‘reﬂexive historical
science’—in that neither has signiﬁcant potential to become ‘nor-
mal’, largely because they deal with unique historical trends rather
than repeatable phenomena. Long-term weather forecasting and
geology are examples of historical sciences, therefore, in that they
are embedded in non-linear systems that cannot be replicated or
modelled with ‘normal’ accuracy and certitude. Alternately, cli-
mate change is a reﬂexive historical question, in that actions in-
formed by climate change science themselves may shape long-
term climate phenomena.
3.1. Historicist uncertainties
Wildﬁre and ﬂood risk mitigation are, as this sectionTable 1
Categories of scientiﬁc uncertainty in wildﬁre and ﬂood risk mitigation.
Uncertainty type Key question
Historicist: the uncertainties arising out of reliance on
historical data, due to methodological relationships
between the past, the present and the future
To what extent do gaps an
the datasets of relevant en
ables affect conﬁdence?
Does the relative rarity, uni
the given hazard event effe
To what extent do we assu
systems ﬂuctuate within a
stationarity?
Instrumental: the uncertainties arising out of limitations
of a given apparatus, heuristic or theorya
To what extent are wildﬁre
counted for in algorithms
What are the obstacles to
sequences to at-risk assets
To what extent are the rele
standards contested?
Interventionist: the uncertainties arising out of calculat-
ing mitigation interventions and their effects
What are a baselines and m
which intervention effects
quantiﬁed?
To what extent are we inte
meters and primary, secon
consequences of interventi
a Note that wildﬁre risk is typically ﬁgured on likelihood of conducive conditions
likelihood of occurrence of rain-driven ﬂood events; and, the spatial modelling of ﬂooddemonstrates, largely populated with (reﬂexive) historical sci-
ences. As such, the ﬁrst category of uncertainty stems from the
necessary reliance of environmental sciences on historical data
(see Table 1). That is, scientiﬁc methods devised to understand the
behaviour of unique environmental systems are necessarily his-
toricist, in that they assume a determining relation between the
past, the present and the future [67]. Wildﬁre and ﬂood behaviour
models, for instance, are both validated by testing their ability to
reproduce past hazard events from historical environmental in-
puts; in predicting ﬂoods, Lane et al. [82] write, ‘the futures ima-
gined [in modelling] are tied to pasts experienced’ in data. Con-
sequently, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant permutation of historicist un-
certainties stem from the gaps and inconsistencies in available
historical datasets on relevant environmental inputs, including
gaps due to innovations in measuring apparatuses, variations in
data metrics, and variations in the geographical spread of mea-
suring apparatuses. For instance, the spatial and temporalElaboration
d inconsistencies in
vironmental vari-
Gaps and inconsistencies can arise out of innovations in
measuring apparatuses, variations in metrics, variations in
the geographical spread of measuring apparatuses, unreli-
able apparatuses, the commercial sensitivity of some data,
fragmented storage, funding constraints, and many other
factors.
queness and force of
ct conﬁdence?
A lack of historical exemplars is a barrier to prediction. For
example: catchment data sets that are based on mean and
medium river ﬂow have limited insights into ﬂood dis-
charges; measuring apparatuses can be destroyed during
wildﬁre and ﬂood events; relative randomness of wildﬁre
ignition points; and, ﬁre behaviour unique to ﬁre–terrain
and ﬁre–atmosphere interactions.
me that natural
n envelope of
Climate change requires recognition of both temporal and
spatial variability into the future, the parameters of which
are uncertain. Incorporating this ‘new’ variability can pre-
sent signiﬁcant obstacles.
behaviours ac-
and simulators?
Hazard behaviours are highly complex (e.g. feedback me-
chanisms between ﬁre and atmosphere, the non-linearity
of catchment responses to rainfall). Difﬁculties with cap-
turing behaviours in models and algorithms may also stem
from the limitations of computational resources, reporting
requirements and historicist uncertainties, such as avail-
able data.
assessing con-
and values?
Assets and values may be spatially static (e.g. property,
infrastructure) or spatially dynamic (e.g. human life, ﬂora
and fauna), which inﬂuences their incorporation into to-
pographical modelling. Dynamic entities may be excluded
or rendered through static proxies.
vant methodological Standards of analysis (e.g. FFDI, ARI) may be contested by
researchers and others because they do not include all
available data or relevant variables. These standards often
inform the framing of scientiﬁc research.
etrics through
have been
The calculation of the beneﬁts and effects of mitigation
interventions is subject to speciﬁc forms of historicist and
instrumental uncertainty, particularly in regards to quan-
tifying the beneﬁt of interventions. What counts as ‘risk’?
Is additionally directly measureable?
rrogating the para-
dary and emergent
ons?
Are uncertain effects of interventions on at-risk values
(e.g.: social effects such as ‘safe development paradox’ or
‘levee effect’, or the ecological effects of prescribed burning
and dams and levees) considered? As Mitigation strategies
and methods are inﬂuenced by non-scientiﬁc aspects such
as policy priorities, social values, and political context,
these unintended consequences should be considered cal-
culable and non-calculable uncertainties.
not on likelihood of occurrence. Flood risk is usually calculated in two ways: the
behaviour.
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moisture content and its vertical distribution), ground water,
channel characteristics, riverine vegetation and river management
in ﬂoodplains all inﬂuence ﬂood behaviour [76,80]. Rainfall is a
highly localised phenomenon, though it is typically measured via
point-based rain gauges whose placement is often highly incon-
sistent. Similarly, while the geographical extent of past wildﬁres is
often available (or deducible), data on their intensity are relatively
recent. There is also historic variation in wind speed metrics,
meaning archives and practise are not only limited by unreliable
measurements but also by the inhomogeneity of units of mea-
surement and, thereby, data homogenisation processes [61,88]. In
other instances, data are commercially sensitive or their collection
and storage is fragmented across parties, creating further ‘holes’ in
the datasets available to private and public agencies predicting and
mitigating natural hazards. Such gaps and inconstancies in his-
torical datasets are an irremediable limit that can have scientiﬁc
and political consequences (e.g. [21]), though not necessarily sig-
niﬁcant ones.
A related second aspect of historicist uncertainty broadly ap-
plicable across environmental sciences stems from the relative
rarity, uniqueness and force of a given hazard event. Cloke and
Pappenberger [[29]] state that the rarity and extreme ﬂow char-
acter of ﬂoods complicates ﬂood prediction in three substantial
ways. First, the bulk of historical data available on a catchment’s
behaviour can produce predictions of mean and median river ﬂow,
however these provide no major insights into ﬂood discharges,
which describe a nonlinear ﬂow once they exceed the riverbank.
Second, any attempt to evaluate meteorological forecasts for hy-
drological applications, and thus to validate ﬂood forecasts, is
fundamentally limited by the low frequency of extreme ﬂoods. It is
difﬁcult to test the correspondence between any hazard phe-
nomenon and its projection in a given site without historical ex-
emplars. Third, in cases where there are historical exemplars,
rarity, force and uniqueness are still inﬂuential as measurements
of river height, velocity or rate of rise may not be recorded or
comprehensive, particularly as major ﬂood events can sometimes
exceed measuring devices and destroy measuring infrastructure.
Equally, the rarity of wildﬁre events creates parallel uncertainties
in wildﬁre prediction, not only because wildﬁre ignition points are
relatively random, but also because wildﬁre behaviour is a product
of unique ﬁre–terrain and ﬁre–atmosphere interactions (see
[136,105,122]). The conﬁdence of predictions is, in this sense,
partly a product of the availability of well-described events for
model validation.
The third permutation of historicist uncertainties stems from
the common assumption in hazard prediction that natural systems
ﬂuctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability known as
‘stationarity’. But, as Westra et al. [149] have argued, the scientiﬁc
consensus regarding the existence of climate change puts in
question both the parameters of this envelope and our ability to
know this envelope, meaning that, as climate scientists suggest,
‘stationarity is dead’ [96].3 Such dramatic proclamations do not,
however, give any indication as to level of ﬂux that must now be
built into environmental sciences. That is, the extent to which
climate change is relevant to the prediction of a given hazard
varies widely depending on the temporal and spatial parameters
of an analysis. For example, while a broad range of global climate
models suggest that overall the Australian continent will ‘experi-
ence consistent and extensive increases in ﬁre probabilities’ over
the next 100 years [99], this increase may involve higher or lower
rainfall or higher or lower fuel availability in different regions at3 El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and other similar global ﬂuctuations also
challenge the precept of stationarity.different times [154,22]. The relevance of climate change to un-
derstandings of a hazard in a particular area is a product of the
anticipated changes in given phenomena—rainfall, temperature,
ﬂora and fauna distribution, and so on—and the timespan over
which they will occur (see [95,86,51]).
Overall, historicist uncertainties emerge from the reliance of
scientiﬁc knowledges on archives of historical data. Their re-
levance in any one context varies. To the extent that they are able
to draw upon rich datasets and well-described historical exemplar
events, and incorporate relevant climate change scenarios, scien-
tiﬁc knowledges are minimally limited by historicist uncertainties.
3.2. Instrumental uncertainties
The instruments brought to bear by scientiﬁc practitioners to
synthesise such heterogeneous data incorporate their own un-
certainties, and while these are particular to each individual con-
text they can nonetheless be broadly categorised. Instrumental
uncertainties emerge from the limitations of a given apparatus,
heuristic or theory used to calculate the probability and con-
sequences of hazard events. As such, it is ﬁrst worth delineating
the dominant ways in which risk calculations occur. For example,
wildﬁre risk in Australia is typically ﬁgured in terms of the like-
lihood of conditions conducive to wildﬁre and not the likelihood of
occurrence (or ignition). Temperature, relative humidity, wind
speed and an estimate of fuel conditions are synthesised as an
FFDI number predicting the intensity of a hypothetical ﬁre (see
[88]), meaning short-term and long-term forecasts of such spatial
data can be used to forecast ‘ﬁre weather’ (e.g. [59]). As in other
ﬁre-prone countries, the companions to such an instrument are
wildﬁre simulators [103], capable of combining ﬁre spread algo-
rithms with spatial data to simulate a wildﬁre’s behaviour within a
landscape (regarding simulators see [72,135]). Similarly, ﬂood risk
is typically calculated in two ways, the ﬁrst being the likelihood of
occurrence of rainfall-driven ﬂood events, produced from statis-
tical analyses of meteorological and archaeological evidence of
past ﬂood events (see [77,11]). The second aspect is a ‘ﬂood study’,
which combines hydrological and hydraulic ﬂood behaviour al-
gorithms with spatial data to simulate ﬂood behaviour within a
ﬂoodplain ([147], regarding simulators see [68]). In each case, as in
meteorological Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) systems,
wildﬁre and ﬂood hazard ‘calculation systems’ often incorporate
Monte Carlo ensemble prediction techniques—where the prob-
abilities of variations around a central ‘control’ forecast are tested
through multiple scenarios—to make forecast uncertainty legible
(e.g. [79,29,48,43]).
In surveying these likelihood and consequence techniques it is
clear that there are three signiﬁcant versions of instrumental un-
certainty. The ﬁrst stems from the difﬁculty of capturing hazard
behaviours in simulators, speciﬁcally due to uncertainties sur-
rounding behaviour algorithms. As engineer Richard Rothermel
[117] noted, it is quite unlikely that the minute-by-minute move-
ment of a ﬁre will ever be accurately predictable due to factors
such as the erratic nature of surface winds and fuel heterogeneity
[134,62]. Nonetheless, wildﬁre models anticipate the macro-dy-
namics of wildﬁre through algorithms representing surface ﬁre
spread, crown ﬁre spread, spot ﬁre spread and atmosphere inter-
action [103]. The algorithms used within a simulator may be
theoretical, semi-empirical and/or empirical in any given instance,
each with their own beneﬁts and limitations. Some behaviours,
such as the distribution of ﬁrebrands by ambient winds or con-
vection columns (known as ‘spotting’), are more elusive than
others [103]. As Saeedian et al. [118] suggest, spotting is difﬁcult
because it incorporates eight elusive variables and is dramatically
inﬂuenced by wind dynamics. Feedback mechanisms between ﬁre
and atmosphere can also be difﬁcult to model [100,136]. The
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regards to surface and subsurface ﬂow processes and the inﬂuence
of ﬂow resistance (see [89]). Whereas the physics of hydrology and
hydraulics assume conservation of mass and momentum, catch-
ment responses to rainfall are necessarily non-linear, meaning
outputs are not directly proportional to inputs [79].
It is important to note two distinct but associated issues faced
by those simulating hazard behaviours. The ﬁrst, linked to his-
toricist uncertainty, is the possible paucity of relevant spatial data
due to resource constraints. While it is widely acknowledged that
data collection is a costly and difﬁcult business, it is important to
understand the inﬂuence of available data infrastructure on a
system. For example, several recent government inquiries in Aus-
tralia have concluded that the coverage of rain and stream gauges
across catchments in Australia is highly inconsistent—due pri-
marily to funding shortfalls and inter-jurisdictional debates
[112,147]—which in turn has consequences for ﬂood mapping [9].
Second, like all scientiﬁc practise, risk mitigation is limited by
what historian Paul Edwards [45] calls the ‘data and computa-
tional friction’ of modelling. In practise, any synthesis of data to
calculate probabilities and generate scenarios strains against the
limitations of available computational resources and reporting
requirements (e.g. [20]). Thus, uncertainties may be introduced to
the practical work of risk mitigation to manage computational
drag. Measuring apparatuses and resources are ﬁnite and we come
to ‘know’ the behaviour of a system within institutional bounds
whose ﬁnitude and inﬂuence may themselves not be obvious (e.g.
[110,37]).
If the ﬁrst form of instrumental uncertainty centres on the
rendering of hazard behaviours, the second iteration centres on
the modelling of at-risk assets and values. What counts as an asset
or value varies, though human life and property are almost uni-
versally prioritised, ahead of critical infrastructure and rare and
endangered ﬂora and fauna. Broadly, we can divide these assets
and values between spatially static entities (property, infra-
structure) and spatially dynamic entities (human life, ﬂora and
fauna) as different kinds of challenges. Static entities can be rea-
sonably easily incorporated into such topographical modelling, for
example as points indicating property position and elevation. A
modelled wildﬁre can, thereby, be used to estimate risk to prop-
erty by relating radiant heat to property loss ([140,31], regarding
property loss in ﬂoods see [6,44]). Data on infrastructure position
and elevation can similarly be incorporated into hydraulic ﬂood
models (e.g. [60]). Alternately, spatially dynamic entities are
somewhat more problematic and, as such, are either excluded or,
more typically, rendered through static proxies. For example, given
the difﬁculty of predicting human behaviour, users of ensemble
wildﬁre modelling software programme PHOENIX RapidFire use
property data as a proxy for human life [2]. In other instances, risk
modellers are able to borrow the synthetic proxies that ecologists
have developed to measure dynamic entities such as ﬂora and
fauna as biodiversity metrics (e.g. [153,91,75]). While there are
important caveats regarding the correspondence between such
measures and actual populations, to the extent that such calcul-
able proxies can be assigned to spatial units—and relation between
hazard behaviours and consequences are known (e.g. [17])—such
assets and values are able to be integrated into models. In general,
signiﬁcant uncertainties surround both the prediction and quan-
tiﬁcation of dynamic entities. Just as it is notoriously difﬁcult to
predict human behaviours in relation to hazard warnings and
hazard events (e.g. [152,49,74,106,93]), it is, for different reasons,
very difﬁcult to quantify the relation between biodiversity and
wildﬁre events (e.g. [4,155]).
The third iteration of instrumental uncertainty stems from the
adoption of methodologies and methodological standards whose
applicability and accuracy are contested, yet continue to iterativelyinﬂuence the framing of scientiﬁc methods and projects. Related to
the uncertainties sourced in data collection, these uncertainties
may originate in resource limitations or ‘cultural’ factors such as
institutional preferences and literacies, also known as path de-
pendency (see [156,13]). Wildﬁre and ﬂood risk mitigation in
Australia both offer primary examples of these standards. Across
Australia, as in Europe [36], most jurisdictions use a ‘100-year
ﬂood’ event as the general standard in ﬂood modelling, mapping
and development planning [33]. This standard has different names
—1% AEP (Annual Exceedence Probability), 100ARI (Average Re-
currence Interval), Q100—but, as Wenger et al. [147] explain, it is
always ‘a statistical estimate of the average period in years be-
tween the occurrence of a ﬂood of a given size’; a 1% AEP or
100ARI ﬂood event have a 1:100 likelihood of occurring in any
given year. But to speak of averages is to invoke a historical dataset
and, thereby, the contention that the given system is sufﬁciently
documented and sufﬁciently stationary as to be averaged. Speci-
ﬁcally, this standard has been criticised for being ‘a very coarse
tool’ for judging and communicating ﬂood risk [157,63], particu-
larly in ﬂoodplains where there is a considerable difference be-
tween a 1%AEP and Probable Maximum Flood (PMF)—the theo-
retically largest ﬂood that could conceivably occur. In such cases,
the standard measure is arguably biased towards underestimating
risk [124,15]. While currently the dataset that forms the basis of
ﬂood estimation is being thoroughly revised in Australia (see [8]),
as it was last updated in 1987, it is worth noting that standard
ﬂood forecasting approaches in the U.S. and United Kingdom have
also recently undergone major criticism [146,148].
Like 1% AEP, the standard measure of wildﬁre hazard in Aus-
tralia is a tool of translation based upon historical data; FFDI, de-
veloped in the 1960s by McArthur and others (see [111]), uses the
conditions on 13 January 1939 or ‘Black Friday’ in Victoria to re-
present the (former) maximum of 100 FFDI [3]. While many con-
sider its simplicity and translatability to be real beneﬁts [119],
others have drawn attention to its insensitivity to ecological var-
iation, its high sensitivity to input variation under extreme con-
ditions, and its inability to incorporate several signiﬁcant en-
vironmental factors that inﬂuence ﬁre behaviour such as fuel type
and topology (e.g. [133,40]). Nonetheless, the institutionalisation
of FFDI as the standard measure of hazard means that it is not only
central to risk mitigation, but also public understandings of ﬁre
risk and the dangers of climate change (e.g. [64]). Like 1% AEP, this
scientiﬁc standard has an operational utility which may inad-
vertently mask the uncertainties and suppositions underpinning
it. In sum, instrumental uncertainties emerge from the internal
and practical limitations of a given apparatus or algorithm. That is,
to the extent that hazard behaviours can be articulated from
available algorithms and spatial data, at-risk values and assets can
be incorporated into hazard simulations, and methodological
standards are current and revisable, scientiﬁc knowledges are
minimally limited by instrumental uncertainties.
3.3. Interventionist uncertainties
The ﬁnal category of scientiﬁc uncertainty addressed by this
review is interventionist uncertainties, which emerge from pre-
dictive calculations regarding the effect of a mitigation interven-
tion. Such interventions may include legal reforms, policy changes,
strategic planning and engineering works, amongst others. Each of
these nominates a broad spectrum of strategies to manage a risk,
often by geographically and/or temporally redistributing it. For
instance, remediation of ﬂood hazard through engineering in-
cludes dams, levees, detention basins (or ‘dry dams’), ﬂood walls,
land clearance, dredging, backﬂow prevention and evacuation in-
frastructure (see [147]). Wildﬁre-related engineering works in-
clude fuel breaks, fuel reduction burning, slashing and thinning
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restrict ourselves to the two primary permutations of interven-
tionist uncertainties. The ﬁrst stems from the common challenge
of quantifying intervention additionality. Interventions are typi-
cally justiﬁed through their anticipated social, environmental or
economic beneﬁt, however this beneﬁt is rife with uncertainties.
Looking at the example of prescribed burning, the dominant form
of wildﬁre risk mitigation in Australia, decades of experimental
data have validated the correlation between increases in the
average area burnt for fuel reduction and decreases in the average
area burnt by wildﬁres [125,19]. However, this correlation tells us
little about how these burns spatially redistribute risk. While one
policy response since the early 2000s has been to intensively re-
duce fuels surrounding suburbs and towns [52], state agencies
have also begun to use ensemble simulators to test treatment
scenarios across landscapes. In Victoria, state agencies simulate
wildﬁres under extreme conditions over a control scenario (no fuel
reduction or ﬁre history) and an experimental scenario (with fuel
reduction and ﬁre history), measuring risk in terms of the differ-
ence between predicted property losses [38]. Subtle and in-
novative as this strategy is, it demonstrates the dependence of
additionality on the parameters of analysis: the description in
spatial data of the present environment; the design of a control
scenario; the selection of a hazard event; and, the selection of a
metric of beneﬁt. The same is true, for instance, in modelling the
additionality of raising a dam wall (e.g. [60,41]). Is the control
scenario credible? Is the hazard event sufﬁciently or excessively
cautious? Is a metric, such as economic beneﬁt, discretely calcul-
able? As such, interventions import historicist and instrumental
uncertainties of their own and are very clearly inﬂuenced by non-
scientiﬁc aspects of mitigation such as policy priorities, world-
views, institutional path dependencies and other contextual
inﬂuences.
If the ﬁrst uncertainty relates to the demonstration of inter-
vention efﬁcacy, the second relates to its reﬂexivity. As noted
earlier, conﬁdence in mitigations can lead to unintended con-
sequences such as the ‘safe development paradox’, or what geo-
grapher Gilbert White [151] described as the ‘levee effect’ (see also
[108,123][104, 7],: 232–234,[25]). Governments, developers and
others may mistake engineering works for protection, subse-
quently reducing development controls and placing more devel-
opment in a perceived ‘safe’ area. Residents, often unknowingly,
then bare high levels of residual risk. Similarly, researchers have
suggested that the perceived effectiveness of risk mitigation
amongst residents can lead to lower levels of preparedness (e.g.
[1,24,57]). Arguably, to return to Wynne’s typology, these are si-
tuations of ‘indeterminacy’ produced by unintended social con-
sequences beyond the control or consideration of scientiﬁc
methods. However, where a correlation is or may be established
they would perhaps be better understood as calculable or non-
calculable uncertainties. Looking at evacuation planning, for ex-
ample, some modellers have attempted to take into consideration
the probabilities of delays that often occur within evacuations,
such as response lag and trafﬁc accidents, in order to calculate the
previously indeterminate (e.g. [102,109]). Other consequences,
such as the ecological consequences of levees and dams to soil
erosion and ﬂood dependant species, are only apparent ‘down-
stream’ after an intervention ([147], for examples see [116,101]).
Today, as Clode and Elgar [28], there are signiﬁcant concerns about
the health, safety, and ecological impact of broad-scale prescribed
burning (see also [27]). For example, in some instances effects on
insect life [137] and biodiversity [23,27,42] may only become in-
cluded in mitigation analyses after implementation.
Alternately, the efﬁcacy of forms of mitigation based around
development planning and building design may or may not in-
clude considerations of implementation. So while the additionalityof planning interventions can be quantiﬁed ‘upstream’, as Godden
and Kung [54], this may require ignoring the frequency with
which such regulations may be waived or not applied (see [90]).
Similar considerations emerge regarding the application of scien-
tiﬁcally-tested regulations stipulating the use of ﬂood and/or ﬁre
resistant building materials and design (e.g. [113,85,94]). In short,
every mitigation strategy elicits a set of uncertainties relating to its
ability to calculate and incorporate consequences of different
types, including secondary and unforeseen consequences. ‘Em-
bracing uncertainty’, therefore, must also include consideration by
risk mitigation practitioners of the relative ability and legal cap-
ability of relevant agencies and individuals to be reﬂexive in re-
gards to the parameters and consequences of interventions. To the
extent that the additionality of a given intervention can be quan-
tiﬁed with a high degree of conﬁdence, and primary, secondary
and emergent consequences can be calculated (and are), scientiﬁc
knowledges are minimally limited by interventionist uncertainties.4. Discussion and conclusion
While a test of these categories is beyond the scope of this
review, it is worth reﬂecting on how these categories might be
utilised in discussing the science of wildﬁre and ﬂood risk miti-
gation. Taking the example of wildﬁre, utilising these categories
would necessarily require an empirical rather than ideal approach
in a given circumstance. This would proceed by ﬁrst attending to
historicist foundations of risk calculation, meaning the actual data
used for estimating risk, asking: to what extent do gaps and in-
consistencies in the datasets of relevant environmental variables
affect conﬁdence? To what extent does the relative rarity, un-
iqueness and force of a wildﬁre event affect conﬁdence? To what
extent do we assume that natural systems ﬂuctuate within an
envelope of stationarity? Second, the instrumental methods actu-
ally being used to calculate risk would need to be discussed, in-
cluding: to what extent are wildﬁre behaviours accounted for in
algorithms and simulators? What are the obstacles to assessing
consequences to at-risk assets and values? To what extent are the
relevant methodological standards contested? Third, the mea-
surement of interventionist strategies used and contemplated
would be analysed, including: what are a baselines and metrics
through which intervention effects have been quantiﬁed? To what
extent are we interrogating the parameters and primary, second-
ary and emergent consequences of interventions? Focusing on
forms of uncertainty in this way differs substantially from a focus
on descriptions of overall scientiﬁc conﬁdence, as adopted by the
IPCC and many others. That is, rather than give a synthetic de-
scription of the overall state of scientiﬁc knowledge, these quali-
tative considerations point towards a deliberative analysis of ap-
plied knowledge. As such, the categories developed here are less a
‘risk instrument’ for transferring information than a programme
for ‘risk dialogue’ between expert and non-expert groups about
how risk is (and can be) quantiﬁed and how it is (and can be)
mitigated.
Scientiﬁc uncertainty can be an inﬂammatory topic in discus-
sions of natural sciences and environmental interventions, as there
are many historical instances in which a lack of certainty has been
exploited to defer responsibility and delay action on urgent issues.
As Sarewitz [120] argues, such manipulation of uncertainty hinges
on an inherently ﬂawed understanding of the relation between
science, uncertainty and effective action. In short, because there
are thresholds to the relative certainty and relevance of data, more
data does not necessarily create more certainty just as more cer-
tainty does not necessarily elicit more effective action. Similarly,
this review has shown that not all uncertainties are created equal
in their inﬂuence or responsiveness to research. A related concern
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effectively communicated outside specialist circles, given both the
dangers of distortion and the beneﬁts of increased public under-
standing of science. There is, for instance, a growing literature on
the relative effectiveness of different expressions of scientiﬁc
conﬁdence—such as natural frequency, odds ratios, mortality rates,
survival rates—on promoting understanding or action in target
groups [145]. More broadly, there are signiﬁcant sociological and
philosophical debates about the social effects and normative
merits of communicating uncertainties to non-scientiﬁc audiences
(see [49]). These debates relate to even larger questions about the
merits, modes and possible limits of transparency in the relay of
scientiﬁc knowledges between scientiﬁc experts, government
agencies, private companies and publics. The fact that un-
certainties are necessary variables in the production of all scien-
tiﬁc knowledges means that the communication of uncertainties is
necessarily a matter of interest to the people creating the knowl-
edge and the people for whom it is intended.
The detection and analysis of scientiﬁc uncertainties relating to
wildﬁre and ﬂood risk mitigation serve a variety of potential
purposes for different audiences. First, for scientiﬁc researchers in
these ﬁelds, attention to the present limits of certainty are a ne-
cessary and productive element in the design, execution and re-
porting of scientiﬁc results. The present mapping of relatively
uncertain relations is, as Landström and Whatmore [81] point out,
a signiﬁcant factor in environmental researchers’ own subsequent
decisions about the selection and funding of future projects. Sec-
ond, for risk mitigation professionals, the present limits of cer-
tainty are not only relevant to decision-making processes regard-
ing the prediction and mitigation of a hazard, but also the justi-
ﬁcation of decisions, the identiﬁcation of knowledge deﬁcits and
the advocacy of policy changes to publics, courts, researchers and
policymakers, amongst others. Third, there are signiﬁcant but
different potential beneﬁts to both publics and policymakers in
acquiring a more robust understanding of scientiﬁc uncertainties.
For publics, this has the potential to create greater participation in,
and ownership of, policy priorities and decisions as well as, some
sociologists suggest, greater personal responsibility for managing
residual risk (e.g. [87,16]). For policymakers, while uncertainty has
frequently been a source of delay and deferral, it is also possible
that an enhanced understanding of uncertainties could sig-
niﬁcantly inform precautionary planning decisions in regards to
at-risk areas (see [18]). The authors suggest that given both the
need for communication about scientiﬁc uncertainties between
different parties, and the potential beneﬁts of increased under-
standing of these uncertainties, the categories outlined in this
literature review will prove useful tools of translation for diverse
groups. Researchers, stakeholders and policy-makers hoping to
understand the scientiﬁc basis of risk mitigation policy and prac-
tise must consider the extent to which different risk mitigation
options are shaped by historicist, instrumental and interventionist
uncertainties. Finally, the authors contend that the categories of
uncertainty established through this review will prove useful as
tools of analysis and translation to social science researchers en-
gaging with professionals in natural hazard mitigation and mod-
elling. Like risk mitigation professionals themselves, social science
researchers must use their knowledge of knowledge and un-
certainty as part of the analytical tools needed to navigate through
contextual complexity [5]. This review has provided one such tool
to this growing area of research.Acknowledgements
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